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Competitive Dynamics and Pricing Behavior in US Hotels: The 
Role of Co-location  
Cathy A. Enz, Linda Canina, Zhaoping Liu 
Cornell University 
Which hotels benefit from locating next to competitors? In this study of 14,995 hotels 
we provide evidence of both a price benefit and a detriment for specific hotels that co-locate next 
to other hotels. Relying on the theoretical framework of agglomeration economics, the results 
reveal that hotels that co-locate in the same geographic cluster with the highest quality 
segmented firms (luxury hotels) accrue a price premium compared to competitors in markets 
with larger proportions of lower-segmented competitors. The strongest price premiums were 
obtained by midscale hotels without food and beverage in clusters with large proportions of 
luxury and upscale hotels. Similarly, high-end hotels that pursue differentiation strategies 
experience price erosion when they are in the same geographic location as lower-end hotels. 
Luxury hotels experienced the greatest price erosion when they operate in locations with large 
proportions of economy and midscale hotels. The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of these findings for competitive dynamics and hotel location decisions. 
Introduction 
Firms in the same industry are highly interdependent as they engage in various actions to 
improve their relative position and profitability. The series of moves and countermoves among various 
firms create the competitive dynamics within an industry (Smith, Ferrier & Ndofor, 2001). Firms likely to 
prosper are most able to anticipate the actions of others in their location and exploit their resources 
through the initiation of strategic responses. While many strategies can be deployed to succeed in 
competitive settings, such as brand affiliation, cost controls, and revenue management, this paper 
suggests that the composition of hotels in a specific geographic location can also shape the competitive 
landscape. 
Can firms enhance their relative competitive position simply by co-locating with the right mix of 
other hotels? In contrast to the traditional view of competitive dynamics, it may be possible for a hotel 
to reap a price benefit just by locating in a particular cluster of hotels. Detriment may also be 
experienced by a high-end hotel if it is located close to lower quality hotels. Whether benefit or 
detriment comes from co-location we argue will depend on the competitive strategies of firms in the 
cluster. The purpose of this paper is to explore the degree to which a firm can extract a price premium, 
or suffer price erosion as a result of the competitive strategies of closely proximate firms. With regard to 
co-location in an industry cluster, also known as agglomeration, the key issue is whether firms can enjoy 
some of the benefits associated with higher-quality segmented local competitors without making similar 
investments in product or service differentiation. The opposite effect is also explored. Will firms that 
rely on a differentiation strategy experience price erosion when they co-locate in a cluster with others in 
lower segments of the industry. The price benefits or detriments that a firm obtains by locating in a 
specific cluster of other firms is termed “spillover”. Spillover occurs when the benefits from the 
strategies of one firm spill over to other firms. We examine the nature of these positive and negative 
“spillover” effects with a sample of 14,995 hotel properties, representing over half of the lodging 
revenues in the United States. 
In the sections to follow the conceptual framework of agglomeration economics and our 
hypotheses will be developed. The methodology section describes the sample, variables, and the 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) data analysis model used in this comprehensive study of hotel 
pricing behavior. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the results in the context of competitive 
positioning and hotel location decisions.  
Theoretical Background 
This section begins with a brief introduction to how location and co-location affect hotels’ 
pricing strategies. The theoretical foundations of agglomeration economics and key empirical studies 
within the lodging industry are then reviewed. The section concludes with an elaboration on how 
competitive strategy sets the baseline for hotel pricing, including a treatment of the consumer behavior 
pricing approach. 
Location, Co-location and Pricing Strategy 
Location selection and pricing decisions are critical for businesses with uncertain demand, high 
costs of product reconfiguration, geographic dispersion, and segmented competition (Baum & Haveman, 
1997). Many studies (Porter, 1994; Bennison, Clarke & Pal, 1995; Pantzalis, 2001) have addressed 
location as a competitive advantage for firms. The striking and persistent differences in the economic 
performance of nations, states, and cities demonstrate that location is not an irrelevant factor (Porter, 
1994). In the hotel industry, marketers have freely asserted that “location, location and location” are the 
three most important attributes that a hotel can offer (Bull, 1994). Some studies have suggested that 
location is among the most important determinants to attract guests to hotels (Mayo, 1974; Cadotte & 
Turgeon, 1988; Horak, 1997). 
Location has become a major factor that influences strategy, especially for promotion and 
pricing strategies (Bull, 1994). Among the many forms of segmented pricing strategy, location pricing 
suggests that firms charge different prices for different locations (Armstrong & Kotler, 2004). Retail 
chains use geo-demographic price discrimination strategies to allot different prices to different markets 
or segments according to their geographic location (Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez- Benito, 2004). 
Location has also become an important asset for a hotel’s pricing decision (Luk, Tam & Wong, 1995). 
Based on the idea of location pricing, hotel managers often charge price premiums for their lodging 
products with good locations. 
Generally, the value of location is measured by distance from specific places such as city center, 
airport, beach or highway (Bull, 1994; Wind, Green, Shifflet & Scarbrough, 1989; Arbel & Pizam, 1977). 
An equally important measurement for the value of location is the amenity or quality of the surrounding 
area. Among the vicinity factors that may affect the value of a hotel location, the characteristics of other 
hotels in the same cluster plays a very important role (Baum & Haveman, 1997; Chung & Kalnins, 2001; 
Kalnins & Chung, 2004; Canina, Enz & Harrison, 2005). This study focuses on the pricing strategy of 
hotels in a geographic cluster and investigates the impact of the characteristics of the hotels in the 
cluster on pricing. We now turn to the agglomeration literature which offers a theoretical framework 
within which to explore the positive and negative externalities associated with geographic clustering. 
The Role of Agglomeration 
Agglomeration describes industry clusters of firms within a particular geographic region (Baum 
& Mezias, 1992; Baum & Haveman, 1997; Chung & Kalnins, 2001). The analysis of agglomeration 
originated from Alfred Marshall’s (1920) concept of external economies (the advantages that are open 
to and shared among a collectivity of businesses). The existence of positive externalities has the 
potential to enhance the performance of agglomerating firms and promotes the geographical 
agglomeration of economic activity (Shaver & Flyer, 2000; Phelps, 2004). 
“Agglomeration is counterintuitive from a traditional economic perspective since competitive 
influences typically are associated with a reduction in performance” (Canina et al., 2005, p. 566). 
Traditional competitive dynamics indicate that co-locating with firms from the same industry may 
increase competition for resources and cause damage (i.e. price competition and hence reduced prices) 
among these closely located firms. For example, Baum and Mezias (1992) found that increased failure 
rates in the Manhattan hotel industry over the past century were due to localized competitive 
influences. Alcácer (2004) suggested that competition discouraged firms from co-locating when markets 
are equally attractive and products are homogeneous. 
However, benefits from co-location are also supported in the literature. Several researchers in 
the field of strategy have observed that highly successful firms from the same industries tend to be 
located in geographic clusters (Porter, 1998). “Shopping malls house multiple clothing and shoe stores; 
antique dealers and jewelry dealers are often found in areas colloquially named ‘Antique Row’ or 
‘Jewelers Row’”(Fischer & Harrington, 1996, p. 281). Other examples include competitive clusters in 
entertainment (Hollywood), computer technology (Silicon Valley), high-tech automobiles (southern 
Germany), and textiles (the Carolinas in the US). 
Marshall (1920) indicated that there are two types of agglomeration gains: those yielding 
production enhancements and those yielding heightened demand. The three sources that enhance 
production are: access to specialized labor, access to specialized intermediate inputs, and knowledge 
spillovers (Marshall, 1920). Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) suggested that manufacturing firms 
contribute to and benefit very differently from spillovers based on the resources they themselves 
possess. 
The major benefit of co-location in service enterprises is heightened demand because the 
consumer can evaluate a variety of offerings within a given area (Fischer & Harrington, 1996). 
Consumers are more likely to be attracted to an area with a large selection of competing services 
(Canina et al., 2005). Restaurants for example often locate right next to each other in a restaurant 
district, while quick-service restaurants tend to build in very close clusters along major streets. The 
advice of professionals who help foodservice chains make site selection decisions provides further 
evidence of the power of agglomeration. One expert when offering advice to Pizza restaurants 
recommended, “Get as close as you can to a traffic heavy retail hub. Look for fast-food places like 
McDonald’s and Burger King” (Karington, 2007). When firms have functional linkages that benefit from 
proximity, the existence of agglomerative forces will bring retail firms together if they sell 
complementary goods (Miller, 1996). 
Under the condition of excessive demand, customers will likely choose another nearby hotel 
when there is no vacancy at the hotel where they initially intend to stay (Chung & Kalnins, 2001). When 
travelers stop along a roadside for the night there are usually an array of hotels next to the highway exit. 
This co-location enables the customer to easily compare neighboring properties. With the rising 
popularity of online hotel booking travel search engines (i.e. www.expedia.com) listing all hotels in a 
specific city district has become a new way in which customers are provided with co- location choices. 
Researchers have found that co-location benefits accrue to some firms more than others 
(Canina et al., 2005; Chung & Kalnins, 2001). Shaver and Flyer (2000) reported that heterogeneous firms 
differ in benefits from agglomerating. Firms using differentiation strategies (with better technologies, 
human capital, training programs, suppliers or distributors) will gain less than those with inferior 
products or services. The lower-end firms can benefit from the spillover contributed by the 
differentiated firms without additional investment. Interestingly, previous work has suggested that 
agglomeration can even harm some firms (Baum & Mezias, 1992). Depending on the strategies of others 
in the same geographic cluster, a firm will gain or be harmed competitively.  
Agglomeration Studies in the Lodging Industry 
The lodging industry is an especially good context in which to study agglomeration effects 
because there are many clusters and the characteristics of these clusters can be compared. It also 
provides a specific context to test the agglomeration effect brought by heightened demand, resource 
heterogeneity and resource spillovers (Kalnins & Chung, 2004). In a hotel cluster, the existence of luxury 
and higher-end hotels increases the attractiveness of an area as a destination. This can be due to their 
service quality, architectural features, and reputations, to name but a few factors that enhance co-
location next to high-end hotels. 
A few agglomeration studies have focused on these effects in the hotel industry. By analyzing 
archival data on 614 transient hotels operating in Manhattan between 1898 and 1990, Baum and 
Haveman (1997) found that “hoteliers locate new hotels sufficiently close to established hotels that are 
similar on one product dimension (price) to benefit from agglomeration economies, but different on 
another product dimension (size), to avoid localized competition and create complementary 
differences”(p. 304). They concluded that hotels are more likely to co-locate with similarly priced 
neighboring incumbent hotels to realize agglomeration effects. The study only measures the absolute 
value of the price distance between entry hotels and incumbent hotels rather than an actual price 
differences (be it positive or negative). 
Using data from Texas hotels and motels in 1992, Chung and Kalnins (2001) found evidence of 
heightened demand from agglomeration and the heterogeneity of agglomeration effect. Hotels in 
markets populated by a higher fraction of chain affiliated and large hotels experienced higher revenues 
per room. Their study suggests that it’s valuable to compare the effects (benefits or detriments) of 
agglomeration in hotel clusters with different characteristics. In a follow-up study with data from 570 
new hotels operating in Texas between 1990 and 1999, Kalnins and Chung (2004) proposed that, 
“entrants will locate near others possessing resources that can spill over, but will avoid locations where 
existing firms will exploit spillovers without contributing” (p. 689). 
Based on broad US hotel industry data, Canina et al. (2005) showed that higher quality hotel 
providers within the industry are more likely to be the providers of agglomeration benefits, while those 
at the other end of the product segment continuum (the lowest quality providers) will capture the 
greatest benefits. For the lodging industry, the heightened demand from agglomeration effects will 
either increase a hotel’s occupancy rate or increase its average daily rate (Chung & Kalnins, 2001). What 
remains unclear is exactly which segments provide benefit or add costs to others in an industry cluster. 
For example, do economy hotels gain greater price benefit from co-locating close to potential direct 
competitors like mid-scale hotels without food and beverage one segment level up, or can they extract a 
higher price premium from proximity to a large proportion of hotels that do not tap into the same 
customer profile, or are several segment levels above? These questions will be addressed in this paper. 
Competitive Strategies and Pricing 
Overall cost leadership and differentiation are two generic competitive strategies used by firms 
to outperform other firms in the same industry (Porter, 1980). To escape the perils of price wars, many 
firms differentiate themselves by quality and price so that they can pursue different market segments. 
D’Aveni (1994) explained how firms differentiate themselves by quality and price: taking the position 
of234 C. A. Enz et al. moderate quality and moderate price as a starting point, some firms can pursue a 
low-cost producer position, offering lower-quality products with lower prices; others can become 
differentiators, offering products with higher perceived quality and charging price premiums. 
A straightforward way of showing the competitive positions of lodging firms is adapted from the 
work of D’Aveni (1994) who maps price and perceived quality. Hotel companies differentiate themselves 
on both price and quality. A budget brand such as Motel 6 offers limited service and charges a lower 
price, whereas a luxury hotel chain like Four Seasons chooses to provide higher-quality products and 
services at a higher price. The low-cost and differentiated hotel providers offer fundamentally different 
things to the customer, but they offer similar value in that the customer gets the level of quality that 
they are willing to pay. 
Network theory argues that firms are not free to choose any competitive action. Instead, they 
must make moves and countermoves within the confines of their geographic cluster (Burt, 1992; Smith 
et al., 2001). In short, the competitive landscape or composition of players in a location constrains some 
actions and may enable others. The composition of a market in terms of the product or service 
segments would suggest that firms in clusters with a large proportion of highly differentiated hotel 
operators would experience pricing opportunities that firms in clusters with predominately low-cost 
providers could not use. Differentiation spillover is when a firm enjoys price benefits from the high 
levels of investment in differentiation made by other hotels in the same location without investing at 
the same levels (Canina et al., 2005). 
The consumer behavior pricing approach also suggests that when firms make price decisions in a 
marketplace with diverse competitors, they should take into account consumers’ choices over 
competitors’ products and prices (Matanovich, Lilien & Rangaswamy, 1999; Danziger, Israeli & 
Bekerman, 2004; Steed & Gu, 2005). For luxury hotels to maintain their status when competition is 
strong, Catrett and Lynn (1999) suggest that “discounting may undermine the scarcity and social 
desirability of a product or service” (p. 36). They recommend that hotel managers “beware of 
association with non-status brands” because “a status product can be tarnished by affiliation with a non-
status offering” (Catrett & Lynn, 1999, p. 39). 
While there are many ways to conceptualize the composition of competitive players, within the 
lodging industry fairly well structured and carefully defined segments exist based on the extent to which 
hotels are differentiated on quality and services offered (Mazzeo, 2002). The classifications are an 
indication of the “credible commitment” made by firms to a particular level of service quality (Ingram, 
1996). In this study we will rely on the widely-used classifications in the industry as indicators of the 
degree to which a group of firms are pursuing a differentiation or low-cost provider strategy. These 
classifications include luxury, upscale, midscale with food and beverage services, midscale without food 
and beverage services, and economy hotels.  
Hypotheses 
Who benefits from the strategic choices of closely proximate firms? Many studies have 
concluded that firms with the weakest resources (i.e. smaller or low-end hotels) will gain from the 
agglomeration effect (Shaver & Flyer, 2000; Chung & Kalnins, 2001; Canina et al., 2005). The hypotheses 
linking the agglomeration effects to hotel pricing for firms pursuing different strategies is summarized in 
Figure 1. In this study, we propose that firms deploying low-cost provider strategies will be the 
recipients of price premiums when they are in a network of hotels with several segments higher or 
highly differentiated products and services. In Figure 2 we show an industry map in which the 
proportion of luxury hotels is greater as illustrated by a larger circle to represent the number of firms 
within this segment. While hotels in different segments offer products with different qualities and 
charge different prices, when a low-end hotel is in a primarily higher-end market, it may obtain the price 
spillover benefit, as shown by the line that moves all segments into a higher price position. This is a 
desirable competitive position for the low-end hotel since it does not have to compete on product 
quality but still obtains a price premium. 
When an economy hotel co-locates with a large proportion of highly differentiated hotels 
(upscale and luxury), it can enjoy a price premium contributed by those high quality hotels, and may 
even be perceived to offer higher quality without necessarily doing so. Hence we offer the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Firms deploying low-cost provider strategies (economy and midscale w/o F&B hotels) will be the 
recipients of price premiums when they are in a hotel cluster with a large proportion of highly 
differentiated hotels (luxury and/or upscale hotels). 
 
 There are many possible reasons that highly differentiated hotels within the same cluster are 
likely to be the providers of price premiums while the lowest quality firms will capture the benefits. 
First, hotels separated by several product quality segments are not direct competitors. The 
heterogeneity of market segments that differentiated firms (high-end hotels) and low-cost provider 
(low-end hotels) are targeting helps to avoid direct competition between them. This is important 
because the heterogeneity that facilitates agglomeration benefits does not evoke between segment 
competition. For example, a customer who might stay at a Westin Hotel will not trade down to a 
Comfort Inn, or visa versa. Another reason why higher-end hotels provide benefit is due to the costs of 
differentiation and the associated high prices that must be obtained in order to recoup those costs. 
Lower- end hotels can obtain price premiums from these other hotels’ investments when for example 
their customers use the public or meeting facilities of higher-end hotels while staying in closely 
proximate low-cost operations. It is also possible that co- location with higher-end hotels can improve 
the image of the lower-end hotels. Therefore, customers would pay a price premium for the higher 
perceived quality of the low-cost providers. 
A variety of other factors may contribute to price decisions including brand affiliation (Ingram, 
1996; Thrane, 2007), regional location (e.g. northern vs. mountain), and setting within a market (e.g. 
urban vs. highway) (Bull, 1994; Wind et al., 1989; Chung & Kalnins, 2001). In addition, characteristics of 
the local market in terms of population density, land area, and number of service, retail, and 
manufacturing establishments can shape demand. Finally, other aspects of the market such as the 
overall heterogeneity or variety of different segmented hotels in a market and their size can shape 
pricing behavior (Chung & Kalnins, 2001). To assure that these variables are not unduly altering the 
impact of proximity to other firms, we will control for a variety of these factors in the current study. At 
the individual hotel level, number of rooms, chain affiliation, and setting (urban, airport, etc.) are all 
factors that could elicit price variations. In addition various locations within a country are able to extract 
higher prices, so regional location is also controlled. Finally, the proportion of larger size hotels in the 
cluster and the heterogeneity of strategies pursued by all firms in the cluster are also held constant. 
 
 
While the first hypothesis explored who benefits from co-location with others pursuing different 
strategies, it is also likely that some firms may give benefit, but receive harm. The focus of the second 
hypothesis is on who is harmed in a geographic cluster. Previous studies suggested that firms with the 
highest resources will gain little or even suffer from co-location with low-resources firms (Shaver & 
Flyer, 2000; Canina et al., 2005). Consistent with those studies, we expect price erosion to occur for 
those highly differentiated firms that are located in clusters with far lower-quality firms. Figure 3 shows 
a change in the location of luxury and upscale hotels when they are in close proximity to lower-end 
hotels in predominately lower quality clusters. The price position for these hotels is lowered as a result 
of co- location next to lower-quality firms. 
Competitors pursuing a low-cost strategy do not contribute as much to the attractiveness of a 
location because they do not offer the range of products and services that co-located firms can benefit 
from. If many low-cost providers are found in the same cluster, agglomeration effects will be negative 
for those firms pursuing differentiation strategies several segments above the low-end providers as the 
following hypothesis suggests: 
H2: Firms deploying differentiating strategies (luxury and/or upscale hotels) will endure price erosion 
when they are co-locating with firms pursuing low- cost provider strategies (economy and midscale 
hotels without food and beverage services). 
Hotels in the middle (midscale with food and beverage) will either benefit from price premiums 
or be harmed by price erosion depending on the proportions and types of other hotels in the same 
cluster. Co-locating with firms offering highly differentiated products and services (luxury and/or upscale 
hotels) can provide price premiums to mid-scale hotels (Figure 4-A). However, if there are a large 
proportion of low-end hotels (economy and/or midscale without F&B) around them, tend to suffer from 
price erosion caused by co-location with low-resource firms. Figure 4 illustrates the possibility for both 
price benefits and price erosion for these mid-market properties depending on the composition of the 
cluster in higher or lower segments of the industry. In a hotel cluster, in which there are similar 
proportions of higher-end and lower-end hotels around the middle market hotels, the positive and 
negative agglomeration effects may neutralize each other. Therefore, the agglomeration effect may not 
be observable. 
H3a: Firms in the middle (midscale w/ F&B hotels) will be the recipients of price premiums when they 
are in a hotel cluster with a large proportion of highly differentiated hotels (luxury and/or upscale 
hotels). 
H3b: Firms in the middle (midscale w/ F&B hotels) will endure price erosion when they are co-locating 
with firms pursuing low-cost provider strategies (economy and midscale w/o F&B hotels). 
The extent of the price benefit or erosion will depend on the make-up of the cluster. For low-
cost providers, the more differentiated the other firms’ products and services the greater the price 
benefit. Lower-segmented firms (economy hotels) will reap price premiums when they are located in a 
cluster with a large proportion of highly-segmented firms (upscale and luxury hotels). The lowest-
segmented firms gain greater price premiums with the increasing of the proportion of firms pursuing a 
strategy that is as distant as possible from their own. The largest benefit will be derived from location in 
a geographic cluster with hotels several segments above the focal hotel, such as an economy hotel in a 
cluster with a large proportion of luxury hotels. 
In contrast, the more the low-cost providers, the greater the price erosion will be. The luxury 
firms will experience the greatest price erosion when they are located in a cluster with a large 
proportion of the lowest price providers. High-segmented firms (luxury hotels) will endure price erosion 
when they co-locate in a cluster with a large proportion of lowest-segmented firms (economy hotels). 
The highest-segmented firms face greater price erosion with the increasing of the proportion of firms 
pursuing a strategy that is as distant as possible from their own. 
To summarize, the greatest price impact of co-location will be experienced in those clusters in 
which the largest proportion of other firms are in a segment that is most distant from the segment of a 
given hotel. The following hypotheses are offered to explore this issue: 
H4a: Prices premiums will be greater for low-cost providers when there are a large proportion of firms 
with greater segment distance in the same geographic cluster. 
H4b: Prices erosion will be greater for highly-differentiated firms when there are a large proportion of 
firms with greater segment distance in the same geographic cluster. 
Method 
Data Source 
The key variables in this study were obtained from Smith Travel Research (STR), an independent 
research organization that tracks lodging performance for all major North American hotels. STR has one 
of the most comprehensive data sources available on the lodging industry, and the data was obtained 
through strict and exclusive confidentiality arrangements. The data captures hotels across the entire 
United States, including over 98% of the chain hotel inventory within the United States. Independent 
hotels are also included in this study and constitute a total of 1,162 hotels in the sample of almost 
15,000. 
Measured Variables 
Strategy-Based Agglomeration: Agglomeration, the key independent variables in this study 
capture the composition of hotels clusters according to their strategic orientation. Hotels can be in 
clusters with either higher or lower quality hotels. The agglomeration variables in this study measure the 
proportion of hotels in given cluster segments above or below the segment of the focal hotel. A luxury 
hotel for example will only be in clusters with hotels in lower segments, and four agglomeration 
variables are possible for these high end hotels. A luxury hotel could be in a cluster with hotels in 
upscale, midscale with and without food and beverage, and economy hotels (a total of four different 
segments). In this study we measure the proportion of hotels in a given hotel’s local cluster by segments 
above or below. 
A total of eight strategy-based agglomeration or co-location measures were created. Each of 
these measures constitutes the proportion of lodging properties in a given cluster that are pursuing a 
quality segment above or below the focal hotel’s segment. For example, if the hotel was in the midscale 
market with food and beverage, the proportion of hotels pursuing one segment above would be upscale 
hotels, and two segments below would be economy hotels. Agglomeration effects were measured at 
the tract level. Tracts are defined by the data provider, Smith Travel Research, as a subset of a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area. The advantage of using the tract as the geographic cluster in this study is 
that it is the smallest location grouping unit for studying agglomeration, for which data can be obtained. 
Hence, lodging properties will be examined with their tracts as the geographic location for comparison 
and agglomeration affects. 
Pricing Variable: The most common measure of hotel room price is the average daily rate (Enz, 
Canina & Walsh, 2001). The key dependent variable in this study was average daily rate (ADR). Since a 
variety of different prices are offered to customers, the average daily rate gives the average, taking into 
consideration the variation that may be due to revenue management activities and business mix. 
Average daily rate was calculated using monthly data aggregated to the annual level in order to 
eliminate seasonal fluctuations within clusters that could reduce our ability to discern true pricing 
effects. 
Control Variables: Many factors other than co-location impact the pricing of lodging firms. 
Hotel Size: A size-based agglomeration variable was added to the models to take into 
consideration the unique contribution of hotel size. It was measuring as the proportion of properties in a 
cluster that are larger in size than the focal firm, based on the number of rooms. 
Strategic and Size Dispersion: We also added a control for within-tract product/ quality 
heterogeneity (strategic dispersion). The segment distance was measured by assigning a number 1 to 5 
to the five types of hotels (economy=l, midscale w/o F&B=2, midscale w/ F&B=3, upscale=4 and 
luxury=5). The segment distance is measured by the absolute value of the differences of those typology 
numbers. For example, the segment distance between a midscale hotel w/o F&B and a luxury hotel is 
|2—5|=3. Creating a Herfindahl-type index, we measured the level of concentration vs. dispersion of 
competitive strategies in a given cluster. To do so, we tallied the number of hotels in each 
product/quality segment, and then divided each tally by the total number of hotels in the cluster. We 
squared each of these proportions and then summed them. High values suggest that the cluster is 
concentrated with respect to strategic type; low values suggest that the cluster is strategically dispersed. 
We also controlled for size dispersion with the coefficient of variation, calculated as the standard 
deviation of within-cluster size divided by the mean. 
Hotel Characteristics and Location: Four characteristics of the hotel were provided: the size by 
number of rooms, whether it is brand affiliated, the location type, and the geographic region of the 
hotel. Chain affiliation was controlled using a dummy variable (Chain Affiliation) to represent hotels as 
either brand affiliated (=1) or independent (=0). With regard to location of the hotel, urban and resort 
locations are expected to have higher prices on average than suburban, airport and highway locations. 
To control for the differences in price across locations dummy variables were created for each of the 
setting categories, with 1 signifying that a hotel belongs to the category and 0 if it does not. We also 
expect that hotels in highly populated regions with expensive real-estate will also have higher prices 
than hotels in more sparsely populated regions. Hence, we controlled for location using nine dummy 
variables. Population, the land area in square miles, and the sum of the number of retail, service and 
manufacturing establishments in the cluster were additional demand-related control variables included 
in the models for the metropolitan area to which the hotel belongs. 
Data Analysis Approach 
In a normal ordinary least-squares (OLS) or multiple linear regression model parameters and 
residual covariance matrices are calculated assuming an independent underlying distribution. In 
circumstances in which there is dependence across observations within a cluster, as is the case in the 
data used in this study, use of the simple multiple regression model can result in erroneous conclusions 
(Greene, 2000). Feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) is a regression technique that accommodates 
misspecified models or models with nonsperical errors. The procedure is to do a least-squares 
regression, then do a covariance-weighted least-squares regression with the residual covariance from 
the first regression model. 
A feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) procedure was used to test our hypotheses because 
of the potential for positive spatial correlation when relying on an ordinary least squares (OLS) approach 
(Azzalini, 1994; Hall & Severini, 1998; Rowell & Walters, 1976). Positive spatial correlation is the 
tendency of observations closer together to be more alike than observations farther apart. The data 
necessitate a FGLS procedure because the set of observations tend to be intercorrelated. This 
correlation must be taken into account to draw valid inferences. In our sample, observations within the 
same market are assumed to be correlated resulting in a covariance matrix of the errors where the off-
diagonal terms within a market are nonzero. In addition, we did not impose homoskedasticity across 
markets. When the covariance matrix of the errors is unknown, it is necessary to use the feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) model where the covariance matrix of the errors is replaced with an 
estimate of the matrix. The results of FGLS analysis can be interpreted similarly to OLS regression. 
Results 
Five feasible generalized least squares regression models were estimated, one for each of the 
five segments in the lodging industry, as shown in Table 1, Columns 1 through 5. The impact of co-
location on the room price of the focal hotel is shown by the magnitude and statistical significance of 
the strategy -based agglomeration variables. As discussed previously the values of these variables 
measure the proportion of hotels in a given cluster above or below the segment of the focal hotel. A 
luxury hotel for example (Column 1) will only be in clusters with hotels in lower segments, and four 
strategy-based agglomeration variables are possible for these high end hotels: upscale, one segment 
down; midscale with food and beverage, two segments down; midscale without food and beverage, 
three segments down; and, economy, four segments down. Upscale hotels (Column 2) will be in clusters 
with luxury hotels, one segment above, and hotels that are one through three segments below 
(midscale with food and beverage through economy). 
In hypothesis 1, we predicted that low-cost hotels will be the recipients of price premiums 
through co-locating with hotels that pursue higher levels of differentiation. Strong support was found 
for the first hypothesis that price premiums exist for low-cost providers such as economy and midscale 
without food and beverage hotels that co-locate in the same geographic cluster with large proportions 
of the highly segmented firms in the industry such as luxury and upscale hotels. The results for the 
economy segment are shown in Column 5 and those for the midscale without food and beverage in 
Column 4. Economy hotels gained significant price premiums from co-location with luxury (four 
segments up). The coefficient of 0.19 is positive and statistically significantly different from zero at the 
0.001 significance level, (p< 0.001). This implies that as the proportion of luxury hotels increases in the 
local market, the ADR of economy hotels also increases. The proportion of upscale hotels (three 
segments up) also has a positive impact on the ADR of economy hotels (i.e. coefficient of 0.14 significant 
at p< 0.01). The insignificant coefficients on the proportion of midscale with food and beverage (two 
segments up) and midscale without food and beverage (one segment up) imply that economy hotels did 
not experience pricing benefits when they were in clusters with large proportions of more direct 
competitor hotels in the midscale segments. Further support for hypothesis 1 is evidenced by the results 
for the midscale hotels without food and beverage, as shown in Column 4. Since the coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant this implies that midscale hotels without food and beverage gained 
price premiums by locating in clusters with upscale hotels (two segments up, coefficient of 0.24, p< 
0.001) and luxury hotels (three segments up, coefficient of 0.35, p<0.001). The magnitude of the benefit 
was greatest due to the luxury hotels that were in their clusters (three segments up, coefficient of 0.35, 
p <0.001). The ADR of midscale with food and beverage also benefited from their proximity to upscale 
hotels (one segment up, coefficient of 0.2, p < 0.01) as well as with luxury hotels (two segments up, 
coefficient of 0.29, p< 0.001). Finally, upscale hotels did not gain co-location benefit from proximity to 
luxury hotels as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient of 0.04. Overall these results show that price 
premiums can be obtained from co-location with hotels that are in higher segments. It also appears that 
midscale hotels are the greatest beneficiaries of price premiums when in markets with substantial 
populations of luxury and upscale hotels. This is evidenced by the relative magnitude of the coefficients. 
For example, the coefficient of three segments up (luxury hotels) for midscale without food and 
beverage is 0.35 while the coefficient of three segments up (upscale hotels) for economy is 0.14 and for 
four segments up (luxury) the coefficient is 0.19. 
Support was found for Hypothesis 2 that predicted firms would suffer price penalties from co-
location with hotels that were using low-cost based strategies. Luxury hotels experienced the greatest 
harm to their pricing by co-locating with all but upscale hotels (coefficient of —0.07 for one segment 
down, upscale but not significant). Each of the coefficients on the other strategy-based agglomeration 
variables for the luxury segment were negative and statistically significant: —0.58 for two segments 
down (midscale with food and beverage); —0.94 for three segments down (midscale without food and 
beverage); and —0.82 for four segments down (economy). Upscale hotels experienced negative effects 
on pricing in markets with large proportions of midscale hotels (one and two segments down), but these 
results were not significant. The prices set by upscale (coefficient of —0.53 p< 0.001) and midscale with 
food and beverage hotels (coefficient of —0.21 p<0.01) were harmed by the presence of large 
proportions of economy hotels, three and two segments down, respectively. The empirical results 
supported the hypotheses that midscale hotels with food and beverage could be recipients of either 
price premiums or price erosion, as stated in hypotheses 3a and 3b. The existence of a large proportion 
of highly differentiated hotels in the same cluster will increase the prices of midscale hotels with food 
and beverage; nevertheless, the prices of these midscale hotels will be eroded by co-locating with a 
large number of low- end hotels. For example, as shown in Column 3, midscale with food and beverage 
hotels, receive price benefits of 0.29 due to co-locating with hotels that are two segments higher 
(luxury) while their price is reduced by —0.21 through co-locating with hotels that are two segments 
down, economy hotels. 
Finally, hypotheses 4a and 4b that the greatest price impact of co-location will be experienced in 
those clusters in which the other firms are in a segment that is most distant from the segment of a given 
hotel was supported, as the size of the coefficients in Table 1 suggest. As the proportion of hotels in a 
geographic cluster came from segments that more directly competed with a hotel, the price premium 
and also the price erosion were diminished. To get the maximum price premium, hotels needed to be in 
locations with the most competitively distant or most differentiated firms in the industry, several 
segments away from their own competitive set. Greater price erosion came from co-location in markets 
with firms that were providing substantially lower-segmented products and prices. The implications that 
emerge from these findings will be discussed next. 
The significance of the various control variables varied by hotel segment, although strong effects 
were found for setting and region. Prices were also shaped by chain affiliation, with positive effects for 
lower-end hotels and negative effects for higher- end hotels. These results suggest that brand affiliation 
enhances price for hotels that pursue low-cost provider strategies, but harm price for highly 
differentiated hotels. Midscale hotels with food and beverage may be stuck in the middle, without 
significant gain or loss of price due to branding. 
 Discussion 
The models provide strong support for the idea that lower-quality competitors can gain benefits 
from co-locating in a market with higher-quality competitors. The results show that lower-cost hotels 
such as economy and midscale hotels gain price premiums from co-locating in markets with a larger 
proportion of firms pursuing a higher-quality differentiation strategy such as luxury and upscale hotels. 
Differentiation spillover would suggest that the economy competitors enjoy price benefits from the 
upscale or luxury hotels without making similar financial investments. In addition, the results show that 
highly differentiated hotels such as luxury hotels do not benefit from co- location with low-cost 
providers. In fact, highly differentiated competitors suffer from negative spillover if a high proportion of 
the other firms in their clusters are in the economy or the midscale segments. It is important to observe 
that these effects were consistent and found across all strategy segments. 
These findings have implications for the effectiveness of pursing a differentiation versus a cost 
leadership strategy. For a differentiation strategy to succeed, the additional revenue generated as a 
result of creating differentiating features should exceed the additional costs of creating those features 
(Porter, 1985, p. 153). However, differentiation attempts can be problematic if the source of 
differentiation provides benefits to competing firms without requiring them to make the associated 
investments. If co-location reduces the ability of high-end firms to distinguish themselves on factors 
other than location, then it is possible or even probable that lower-end firms can enjoy some of the 
demand advantages created by the higher-end firms. While all lower-end firms reap agglomeration 
benefits from co-location with higher-end firms, we find evidence to suggest that strategic segments 
that are co-located with higher-quality products and services may be the greatest beneficiaries from 
differentiation spillovers. Based on coefficient values, midscale hotels appear to reap the greatest 
positive agglomeration effects followed in descending order from higher to lower quality segments. 
In a low-tech service industry such as lodging, restaurants or retails stores, higher- end 
competitors may have difficulty preventing lower-end competitors from entering the same market 
because of insufficient entry barriers. They may also find that they provide the greatest spillover 
benefits to firms that are most likely to attract their customers. Our central arguments follow the 
reasoning that service firms agglomerate, in part, because of the expectation of increased demand. 
Since our dependent variable is based on demand effects, our results are consistent with this reasoning. 
Size was used as a control variable; however, it is interesting to note that we observed the 
economies of size-based agglomeration for three of the five segment tests. For the most highly-
differentiated firms (luxury and upscale), performance was higher when they operated in clusters of 
larger sized firms. A similar effect was found for firms pursuing the lowest-cost orientation. These results 
both confirm and extend past findings. Chung and Kalnins (2001) found that size-based agglomeration 
influenced performance for firms in rural areas, which would typically be lower-end properties. We 
discovered a similar size-based agglomeration effect but for both highly differentiated firms and low-
cost firms. 
The results have important implications for our understanding of the competitive dynamics of 
the industry. They suggest that to avoid price erosion, the owners and managers of luxury hotels would 
be well advised to not locate in close proximity to any other type of hotel since co-location reduces the 
ability of high-end firms to distinguish themselves. The other implication of these findings is that firms 
benefit when they are pursuing strategies that are very different from others in the cluster. Economy 
hotels get the best price premiums from being in markets with upscale and luxury hotels. This finding is 
consistent with previous research that would advise firms to break away from the industry to gain 
competitive advantage (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982; Hamel, 1998; Young, Smith & Grimm, 1996). 
Low-cost providers should seek clusters that are heavily populated with hotels from extremely different 
segments. 
These results have managerial as well as statistical significance, especially considering that we 
controlled for so many other factors that influence price. As noted, we would advise luxury hotels to 
locate outside of hotel clusters, while the economy hotel developer could obtain a disproportionate 
price premium if locating in the shadows of luxury and upscale hotels. In the end, luxury hotels bear a 
disproportionate cost associated with differentiating their products or services, while economy and 
midscale firms can use co-location to share in the benefits from such differentiation. For firms with 
multiple-brands, the corporation should be very aggressive in assuring that its own lower-end brands, 
versus its competitors are the recipients of its higher-end hotel spillover benefits. 
The practical implications of this study are that low-end competitors gain a benefit from locating 
near a high proportion of differentiated hotels (positive spillover), while high-end hotels lose value from 
locating near lower-end competitors (negative spillover). With regard to positive spillover, consider a 
144 room midscale firm without food and beverage service that is located in a cluster with 20% of the 
luxury hotels. Compare this to a midscale firm (also without food and beverage) that shares a cluster 
with 60 percent of hotels in the luxury segment. The difference of 40 percentage points (60% minus 
20%) can be multiplied by the coefficient of 0.35 (see Table 1, column 4) and then by the average hotel 
size of 144 rooms, and finally multiply this result by 365 days per year to determine the incremental 
potential benefit of co-locating with luxury hotels to the firm in the high-quality cluster (60% luxury) 
relative to the hotel in the lower quality cluster (20% luxury), in this case, about $730,000. This benefit 
may increase further dues to differences in the percentage of upscale and midscale with food and 
beverage properties across the two locations. This estimate is particularly informative, considering that 
we controlled for so many other factors that influence demand. We must note that as differences across 
clusters are increased or reduced, these numbers will vary and that the coefficient varies from segment 
to segment, with the strongest effects in the midscale without food and beverage and the lowest in the 
economy classification. Basically, the results suggest that for higher performance, hotels should try to 
locate near luxury properties and away from economy hotels.  
Limitations and Conclusions 
The finds of this study apply most directly to hotels and other service firms where location is an 
especially critical variable to success. For many such businesses (e.g. restaurants) co-location is common 
and local competition is fierce. Our central arguments follow the reasoning that service firms 
agglomerate, in part, because of the expectation of increased demand from operating in clusters. Price 
benefits come from two sources. One source of benefit is from co-location with higher segmented 
hotels. The second source of benefit is from operating a hotel in a lower segment that is more distant 
from the segment of other hotels in the cluster. While this study included a variety of demand-related 
control variables, it may not have eliminated the possibility that high hotel density in an area is driven by 
factors such as tourism attractions or events other than existing hotel clusters. As a result, this area of 
research would benefit from the inclusion of local tourism attractions and other demand generators as 
additional controls.  
The cross-sectional nature of the data used in this study prohibits us from examining or 
exploring market “order-of-entry” and identifying the process of cluster formation. A longitudinal study 
that explores the impact on entry of the cluster profile of existing hotels is a fruitful area for further 
research. Additional research is needed on the formation and evolution of hotel clusters overtime. Do 
higher-end hotels enter early and others co-locate to reap the benefit. If so, does this reduce the benefit 
for the higher-end hotels over time. Early entrants to any business often bear a disproportionate 
development expense. Locating in a new market can be expensive due to the costs associated with 
training a local workforce, obtaining necessary community support and other factors such as building 
permits, and building consumer awareness through promotion and advertising. Our results might 
suggest that a firm that is more interested in keeping costs low can enter the market cluster later with 
relatively lower expenses and still reap the advantages created by early entrants. However, we do not 
test this notion. A longitudinal test of this idea would be appropriate (i.e. Kalnins and Chung, 2004). 
In addition, a possible bias could exist due to endogeneity between the location decisions hotel 
companies were making and their cluster-based performance (Shaver, 1998). However, we do not 
believe that the problem Shaver (1998) identified is likely to be serious in our study. In his conclusion, he 
states, “Second, to the extent that mistakes are common, the factors that make one strategy more 
attractive than another are not well understood by decision makers, or all determinants of performance 
can be identified and measured, self-selection will not affect the estimates of strategy performance” (p. 
584). We believe that factors associated with selecting a particular cluster are not well understood by 
decision makers, especially the primary factor we are examining in this study (influence of the 
proportion of competitors pursuing a higher level of differentiation). Part of our belief stems from the 
counterintuitive nature of what we are saying. It is somewhat counterintuitive to think that rates can 
increase by clustering close to competitor firms. Also, we have included a large set of control variables 
that represent other location-related factors that influence performance. This should help mitigate 
possible bias. 
In conclusion, this study found pricing benefits and detriments for hotels that locate in various 
types of competitive clusters. Hotels that locate in close proximity to higher segmented hotels (e.g. 
economy hotels with upscale and luxury hotels) benefit without making similar product and service 
investments themselves. Alternatively, co-locating with a high percentage of hotels in lower product 
segments (e.g. luxury hotels with midscale and economy hotels) erodes the prices of higher segmented 
properties. These effects are magnified by the degree of between segment differences in the cluster. 
Luxury hotels did not experience significant price erosion in clusters of upscale hotels, and upscale 
hotels did not suffer in markets with midscale hotels, reinforcing the distinction between closely 
competitive and distantly different segment benefits and detriments. Finally, the study revealed that the 
midmarket hotels can both reap benefit in clusters that are composed of higher segmented firms, and 
detriment in clusters with lower-end firms. This study by exploring agglomeration in multiple industry 
segments has provided a major contribution of refining our general understanding of agglomeration 
dynamics. 
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